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In neurocognitive research on language, the processing principles of the system at hand
are usually assumed to be relatively invariant. However, research on attention, memory,
decision-making, and social judgment has shown that mood can substantially modulate
how the brain processes information. For example, in a bad mood, people typically have
a narrower focus of attention and rely less on heuristics. In the face of such pervasive
mood effects elsewhere in the brain, it seems unlikely that language processing would
remain untouched. In an EEG experiment, we manipulated the mood of participants just
before they read texts that confirmed or disconfirmed verb-based expectations about who
would be talked about next (e.g., that “David praised Linda because . . . ” would continue
about Linda, not David), or that respected or violated a syntactic agreement rule (e.g.,
“The boys turns”). ERPs showed that mood had little effect on syntactic parsing, but
did substantially affect referential anticipation: whereas readers anticipated information
about a specific person when they were in a good mood, a bad mood completely
abolished such anticipation. A behavioral follow-up experiment suggested that a bad
mood did not interfere with verb-based expectations per se, but prevented readers from
using that information rapidly enough to predict upcoming reference on the fly, as the
sentence unfolds. In all, our results reveal that background mood, a rather unobtrusive
affective state, selectively changes a crucial aspect of real-time language processing.
This observation fits well with other observed interactions between language processing
and affect (emotions, preferences, attitudes, mood), and more generally testifies to the
importance of studying “cold” cognitive functions in relation to “hot” aspects of the brain.
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INTRODUCTION
In cognitive science and neuroscience, we tend to assume—
implicitly or explicitly—that the architecture of the mind is
relatively invariant. Of course, there are massive changes dur-
ing development, and as a result of pathology. However, there’s
a shared idea that somewhere between the promising torrents
of childhood and the dangerous waters of old age or disease,
the mental faculties of Homo Sapiens are in more quiet waters,
involving operational principles that are relatively stable over con-
text and time. In the studies reported below, we examine the
stability of one of our species’ most distinctive mental faculties:
the language architecture.
At some level, the invariance assumption simply has to be cor-
rect. If minds were totally variable all of the time, with no stable
principles of operation, we’d all have a very hard time predicting
and understanding the thoughts, feelings, and actions of our con-
specifics. The results would be disastrous: parenting would fail,
communication and other types of coordination would be impos-
sible, groups would dismantle, and societies would collapse. At
the same time, we know that the mind’s mode of operation can
to some extent be adjusted even in quiet waters. A familiar exam-
ple of such functional adjustment is sleep. A perhaps less obvious
example in this context, but well-known as a phenomenon to all
of us, is mood.
Mood is a relatively slow-changing affective background state,
a usuallymild positive or negative feeling that is not strongly asso-
ciated with particular objects or events, and has little cognitive
content (Forgas, 1995; Scherer, 2005). Compared to full-blown
event-triggered emotions such as rage, exhilaration, or surprise,
mood fluctuates less rapidly, and usually less intensely (Scherer,
2005). But fluctuation should not be too slow: when people are in
a bad mood for months, we enter the realm of mood disorders,
such as dysthymia or major depression (Davidson et al., 2002a,b).
MOOD AND COGNITIVE PROCESSING
Why should we see mood as adjusting the mind’s mode of oper-
ation? One good reason is that mood is known to affect mental
functioning in systematic ways, across a wide array of phenom-
ena. Relative to a bad mood, for example, a good mood tends to
widen the spotlight of visual attention (Rowe et al., 2007; Schmitz
et al., 2009), reduce the attractiveness of familiar stimuli (de Vries
et al., 2010), and decrease the perceived bioenergetics costs of
certain actions (such as climbing a hill; Zadra and Clore, 2011).
A good mood also tends to increase the scope and impact of
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routinememory-based thinking, evidenced in broader associative
memory retrieval (Bolte et al., 2003; Rowe et al., 2007), stronger
use of scripts in episodic memory retrieval (Bless et al., 1996),
and stronger sensitivity to social stereotypes in person judgment
(Park and Banaji, 2000). It can facilitate creative problem-solving
(Baas et al., 2008; Subramaniam et al., 2008; Davis, 2009), and
reduces the degree of conflict-driven control (Van Steenbergen
et al., 2010). And, on the downside, a good mood can make peo-
ple more sensitive to weak arguments in persuasion (Bless et al.,
1990; Forgas, 2007), and to misleading information in eyewitness
memory (Forgas et al., 2005).
Most theorists assume that these changes are functional, and
that mood plays a useful role in the workings of the mind.
According to the affect-as-information hypothesis (e.g., Clore and
Huntsinger, 2007), mood provides experiential and bodily infor-
mation about the value of whatever comes to mind, a free-floating
“somatic marker” (Damasio, 1996) that signals whether your
cognitions and actions are generally on the right track or not.
A related proposal is that a good mood loosens the control of
deliberate, analytic but effortful “System 2” processing, thereby
increasing the impact of memory-based low-cost “System 1”
operations (Bar, 2009; Kahneman, 2011). What these and other
accounts have in common is that mood is viewed as adjusting
or “tuning” the operational principles of our mind in ways that
are, on average, believed to increase the adaptive value of our
behavior.
This tuning is usually discussed in terms of two basic modes of
operation, with a good mood promoting an associative, “broad
big-picture” style of thinking that relies on heuristics, i.e., rules of
thumb that tend to work well in many but not all cases, and a bad
mood promoting a narrower, more conservative and careful focus
on the details instead (see Fiedler, 2001; Clore and Huntsinger,
2007; Friedman and Förster, 2010; Zadra and Clore, 2011; Shiota
and Kalat, 2012, for reviews). Loosely speaking, the idea is that
a good mood tells you to trust your instincts and go out there
to explore, whereas a bad mood leads you to be more wary, to
mentally stay put, and check out the details of whatever current
problem seems to be at hand. Importantly, both modes of oper-
ation have their uses: there are times when it is best to stay put
and recover from fatigue, injury or the stress of the unknown, but
we also occasionally need to go out there into the wild, if only to
look for food, mates, or creative solutions that improve the qual-
ity of life. In a bio-energetic perspective (e.g., Zadra and Clore,
2011), mood is seen as directly signaling the amount of resources
available for such exploratory behavior.
MOOD AND LANGUAGE PROCESSING
So what about language processing? In view of the above, it seems
unlikely that the operational principles of our language archi-
tecture would remain completely unaffected. And indeed, mood
has been reported to affect such diverse things as the level of
abstractness in verbal autobiographical narrative (Beukeboom
and Semin, 2005), the unusualness of words generated in a
verbal association task (Isen et al., 1985), the response to syn-
tactic anomalies (Vissers et al., 2010), the response to mood-
incongruent words (Chung et al., 1996; Kiefer et al., 2006; Pratt
and Kelly, 2008) and to mood-incongruent developments in
discourse (Egidi and Gerrig, 2009; Egidi and Nusbaum, 2012),
and the response to unexpected neutral concepts in sentences or
discourse (Federmeier et al., 2001; Chwilla et al., 2011; Lai et al.,
2012; Pinheiro et al., 2013).
Here, we explore whether mood affects the anticipation of
referents during discourse comprehension. More specifically, we
look at the processing of phrases such as “Linda praised David
because . . . ,” and ask to what extent mood tunes the degree
to which readers predict who will be talked about next. An
important reason for asking this particular question is that estab-
lishing reference is a core aspect of language comprehension
(Clark, 1996; Garrett and Harnish, 2007; Van Berkum et al.,
2007). Reference is critical to understanding “who does what to
whom” in language—operating at the interface between timeless
sentence meaning and fully contextualized utterance meaning,
reference links the generic linguistic code to specific entities
in the discourse. Establishing reference (or “joint attention”) is
also at the heart of the human “interaction engine,” the shared
infrastructure for communication that underlies linguistic and
non-linguistic communication alike (Levinson, 2006; Tomasello,
2008). Therefore, an examination of how mood affects this pro-
cess has potentially broad implications, beyond the sentence
given.
THE IMPLICIT CAUSALITY BIAS
In the studies reported below, we build on earlier research involv-
ing verb-based implicit causality. Implicit causality information is
stereotypical knowledge about the causal roles of people engaged
in interpersonal events denoted by verbs like “praise” or “apolo-
gize” (Garvey and Caramazza, 1974). When asked to complete a
fragment such as “Linda praised David because . . . ” in an off-line
test, readers and listeners are inclined to continue with some-
thing about David, e.g., “. . . because he had done well.” However,
after “Linda apologized to David because . . . ,” people tend to
continue with something about Linda instead. In “NP1 verb-ed
NP2 because . . . ” constructions, specific interpersonal verbs like
“praise” and “apologize” thus supply information about whose
behavior or state is the more likely immediate cause of the event
at hand (the person denoted by NP2 with “praise,” and by NP1
with “apologize”). This verb-specific asymmetry is referred to as
the implicit causality bias, and verbs like “praise” and “apologize”
are sometimes labeled NP2- and NP1-verbs.
It turns out, at least under conditions where the participants’
mood was not manipulated, that this implicit causality bias can
rapidly lead readers to anticipate, on the fly, who will be in focus
in the subsequent because-clause. Evidence for this comes from
studies that compared the processing of sentences in which the
because-clause continues with a bias-consistent referring pro-
noun (as in “Linda praised David because he . . . ”) to that of
sentences where the referring pronoun is bias-inconsistent (as
in “David praised Linda because he . . . ”). In self-paced read-
ing and eye tracking studies (Koornneef and Van Berkum, 2006;
Featherstone and Sturt, 2010; Pyykkönen and Järvikivi, 2010),
bias-inconsistent pronouns caused readers to slow down right
at or shortly after the critical pronoun. Comparable evidence
for such anticipation of referents comes from an event-related
brain potentials follow-up (Van Berkum et al., 2007), where the
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processing costs of bias-inconsistent pronouns emerged in ERPs
right at the critical pronoun, as a widely distributed positive ERP
effect between 400–700ms. These behavioral and neurophysio-
logical processing costs of bias-inconsistent pronouns show that
readers were at that point in the sentence indeed anticipating a
reference to somebody else.
In the below ERP experiment, we used the positive ERP deflec-
tion to bias-inconsistent pronouns observed by Van Berkum et al.
(2007) as an index of the degree to which readers use implicit
causality information to anticipate who will be talked about
next, as the discourse unfolds. Based on mood research in other
domains (e.g., script-based memory retrieval, interpersonal judg-
ment; Bless et al., 1996; Park and Banaji, 2000), we suspected that
a good mood might foster such referential anticipation, and a bad
mood might attenuate it. After all, anticipation based on implicit
causality can be seen as a form of heuristic thinking, where peo-
ple use a rule of thumb to extrapolate from what they reliably
know—for example, that some David praised some Linda, and
that the speaker is about to give a reason for this event—to what
else might soon be the case: that the speaker is going to talk about
Linda. Combining this with the Van Berkum et al. (2007) finding,
we predicted that positive mood induction should promote antic-
ipation based on implicit causality, reflected in a large globally
distributed differential ERP positivity to bias-inconsistent pro-
nouns around 400–700ms. In contrast, negative mood induction
should lead to a weaker reliance on implicit causality, observable
as a weaker, possibly even absent differential ERP positivity to
bias-inconsistent pronouns.
We also included a control measure that involved a qualita-
tively different aspect of language processing: syntactic parsing.
We probed the latter by means of subject-verb number agreement
violations (as in “The girls is watching TV”), relative to a corre-
sponding correct phrase structure (e.g., “The girls are watching
TV”). Such syntactic agreement violations are known to reliably
elicit a so-called P600 effect (Hagoort et al., 1993; Osterhout
et al., 2012), sometimes preceded by an earlier anterior negativity.
Reasoning from the idea that mood would particularly affect the
use of conceptual rules of thumb (scripts, stereotypes, etc.), we
did not specifically predict a mood effect on the readers’ response
to syntactic agreement violations.
EEG EXPERIMENT: METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
The EEG-study was conducted with 55 right-handed female
native speakers of Dutch without diagnosed neurological or read-
ing impairment, and without current use of antidepressants.
All participants gave informed consent, in accordance with the
Declaration of Helsinki. Six participants were excluded because of
technical or other problems in one or both of their recording ses-
sions, and 17 more participants lost too many segments to EEG
artifacts (see below), leaving 32 participants for analysis, with a
mean age of 21.4 years (range 18–29).
We checked for signs of depression by means of a Dutch
adaptation of the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS,
Watson et al., 1988; Peeters et al., 1996). Participants rated the
frequency with which they generally experience each of 10 pos-
itive and 10 negative emotions on a 5-point scale ranging from
“(almost) never” (1) to “very often” (5). The PANAS uses separate
cumulative scores for the positive affect (PA) and negative affect
(NA) subscales, with scores ranging from 10 to 50 for each. For
our 32 respondents, mean PA was 34.2 (range 29–43) and mean
NA was 21.3 (14–33), which, according to Dutch norming data
(Peeters et al., 1996) are representative of the general non-clinical
population. Also, none of the individual participants had extreme
scores that might indicate depression (PA ≤ 26, NA ≥ 34).
Because of the nature of our mood manipulation (see below),
we also collected participant scores on a Dutch adaptation of the
Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI, Davis, 1983), with a particular
focus on the first three of its four 7-item subscales: Fantasy (FS),
the tendency to transpose oneself imaginatively into feelings and
actions of fictitious characters in books, movies and plays, and,
in one item, of oneself in the future (essentially a measure of nar-
rative transportation, Green, 2004); Empathic Concern (EC), the
“other-oriented” tendency to experience compassion and concern
for other people; and Personal Distress (PD), the “self-oriented”
tendency to have feelings of unease and discomfort in tense inter-
personal settings. Participants rated items on a 5-point scale (0 =
not typical for me; 4 = very typical for me), and scores were aver-
aged per subscale.Mean IRI scores were 2.7 for FS (range 0.9–4.0),
2.8 for EC (1.6–4.0), and 1.8 for PD (0.7–3.3).
LANGUAGE MATERIALS
Implicit causality items
To assess referential anticipation based on implicit causality, we
expanded the original Dutch item set of the Van Berkum et al.
(2007) ERP study into 144 two-variant mini-stories using the
same construction criteria and implicit causality verbs as used for
that ERP study. Half of the stories used an NP1-biased implicit
causality verb (e.g., “apologize”) in the critical sentence, leading
readers to expect more information about the first-mentioned
character. The other half used an NP2-biased implicit causality
verb (e.g., “praise”), leading readers to expect more information
about the second-mentioned character. The critical manipulation
was whether the subsequent singular gender-marked personal
pronoun confirmed or disconfirmed those expectations. Because
the Dutch equivalent of singular “she” (“zij”) also allows for
a plural gender-unmarked reading, we always used the Dutch
equivalent of unambiguous singular “he” (“hij”), and made sure
that the pronoun confirmed or disconfirmed expectations by
switching the position of the male and female character in the
same sentence. A translated example item is shown in (1), with
the critical pronounmarked for expository purposes only; see the
Appendix for more examples (also in Dutch).
(1a) Implicit causality: bias-consistent pronoun
Joe Biden and Sarah Palin prepared for a very important
debate. They were both nervous, as this debate would cer-
tainly affect the elections. Sarah feared Joe because he was
fully aware of her ignorance.
(1b) Implicit causality: bias-inconsistent pronoun
Joe Biden and Sarah Palin prepared for a very important
debate. They were both nervous, as this debate would cer-
tainly affect the elections. Joe feared Sarah because he was
fully aware of her popularity.
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The strength of the implicit causality bias was checked in a paper-
and-pencil pretest with 40 Dutch participants (32 female; mean
age 21.7, range 18–27) who read our stories truncated right after
“because . . . ,” and were asked to complete them while using “he”
or singular “she.” A story with 50% “he” and 50% “she” com-
pletions (across all respondents) is unbiased, whereas a story
with 100% “he” and 0% “she” completions, or vice versa, is fully
biased. All selected stories had a bias toward the intended male or
female character of at least 70%, with a mean bias of 88%.
Of the 40 implicit causality verbs used in the original set,
22 have rather negative connotations (e.g., “torment,” “tease,”
“loathe”; see Van Berkum et al., 2007), against 11 with positive
connotations (e.g., “praise,” “admire”). To redress the balance, we
eliminated two of the weakest negative verbs (“mislead,” “intimi-
date”), and used the remaining negative verbs less often than the
others: across the 144 two-variant IC-critical stories, the 20 nega-
tive verbs were used 64 times (average 3.2, range 1–4 times, 44%
of the set), the 11 positive verbs were used 47 times (average 4.3,
range 3–6 times, 33% of the set), and the 7 neutral verbs were
used 33 times (average 4.7, range 3–6 times, 23% of the set).
To mask the frequent use of “omdat hij” in critical sentences,
we also used “omdat” followed by other pronouns earlier in the
implicit causality stories (21 times) as well as in some of the sepa-
rate syntax stories described below (14 times). Further distraction
was provided by setting up comparable two-person scenarios
without “omdat” in the separate syntax stories (34 times), by
mixing definite NPs (e.g., the neighbor) with proper names of
celebrities (e.g., Tom Cruise) and other persons in the implicit
causality stories (55, 38, and 6% respectively), by mixing past and
present tense (74 and 26% respectively), and by having highly
varied materials in terms of contents and genre.
Syntax items
We created 144 additional stories or story fragments that con-
tained a subject-verb agreement violation, or a correctly agreeing
control verb, in sentence-medial position. A translated example
item is shown in (2), with the critical verb marked for expository
purposes only; see the Appendix for more examples.
(2a) Syntax: correct subject-verb agreement
Paul and Jim really like to challenge each other all the time.
The boys turn even the slightest difference of opinion into a
bet.
(2b) Syntax: violated subject-verb agreement
Paul and Jim really like to challenge each other all the time.
The boys turns even the slightest difference of opinion into
a bet.
To minimize session time and participant fatigue, only half of
the required 144 syntax items were independent stories. The
other syntax items were realized by adding a single coherent
continuation sentence to bias-consistent implicit causality sto-
ries. Anomalous verbs could be singular or plural (55 vs. 45%),
and were embedded in active present- or past-tense construc-
tions in which the specific verb itself was relatively unpredictable.
Anomalous and correct verbs were set-wise matched on average
written word frequency (Twente Corpus log string-frequency of
3.3 and 3.2, respectively) and average word length (6.3 and 6.4
letters respectively, range 3–10). Critical words in the implicit
causality and syntax subdesigns werematched on average position
in the story (at 27.8 and 26.8 words, respectively). The resulting
full item set consisted of 216 critical mini-stories of two, three, or
four sentences with an average length of 37.3 words, as well as 24
filler items used for starting or resuming the task after a break. All
Dutch items can be obtained from the first author.
Every participant saw half of the items in their first record-
ing session (with either positive or negative mood induction) and
the other half in their second recording session (with negative or
positive mood induction). A single story item was presented to
any one participant in just one of its two variants. Each of eight
different lists contained 108 critical stories: 36 bias-inconsistent,
36 bias-consistent of which half syntactically anomalous and half
syntactically correct, and 36 pure syntax items of which half syn-
tactically anomalous and half syntactically correct. Four lists were
generated by rotating conditions over a single base randomiza-
tion using half of the items, four more were generated by using
the other half of the items, and each of the resulting lists fea-
tured equally often in sessions 1 and 2, as well as, fully crossed,
with positive and negative mood induction. Item subsets used
for condition rotation were matched on average bias strength
(implicit causality items only), critical word length (syntax items
only), and mean position of the critical word in the story. The
item randomization procedure evenly distributed item types and
conditions over five blocks, avoided lengthy sequences of bias-
inconsistent and/or syntactically anomalous items (max 4 in a
row), and always had each block start with 2–3 fillers. Each final
list contained 120 stories, and was preceded by a 10-item practice
block.
MOOD INDUCTION AND MANIPULATION CHECK
We used short film clips to change mood in a positive or neg-
ative direction, as the effects of such clips are known to be
robust and relatively long-lasting (Gross and Levenson, 1995;
Rottenberg et al., 2007). For positive and negative mood induc-
tion, we selected five fragments from Happy Feet and Sophie’s
Choice respectively, movies that have been used effectively in ear-
lier mood research. Fragments were chronologically selected such
that they were maximally cheerful or depressing, relatively coher-
ent as a unit, and comprehensible in terms of the larger plot
unfolding over these clips. Fragments lasted for some 3.7min
(range 2:58–5:23m:ss), so that participants saw about 18–19min
of cheerful or depressing film per session. Post-session film rat-
ings in which participants evaluated the clips they had seen on
two positive mood-related adjectives (cheerful and funny) and
two negative mood-related adjectives (sad and moving), mixed
with six less clearly valenced adjectives (such as intense or compli-
cated) confirmed the valence of our selections, with Happy Feet
consistently rated as positive, and Sophie’s Choice rated as nega-
tive, by all participants (see also Table 1, left panel, in the Results
section).
To assess the mood of our participants before and throughout
each session, we adapted a paper-and-pencil self-report question-
naire used in earlier mood research (de Vries, 2008). Participants
were asked to quickly indicate how they felt “at this time” (for
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Table 1 | Post-session film rating means (bold) and standard deviations (regular) for Happy Feet and Sophie’s Choice clips seen in the EEG
experiment (left) or the behavioral post-test (right), on a 7-point adjective rating scale (1 = not at all, 7 = very).
Film rating (1 = not at all, 7
= very)
EEG experiment Behavioral experiment
Happy
Feet
Sophie’s
Choice
F (1, 30) p Happy
Feet
Sophie’s
Choice
F (1, 38) p
Cheerful (“vrolijk”) 6.13
0.6
1.50
0.6
1173.4 000*** 5.95
0.9
1.50
0.6
342.8 000***
Funny (“grappig”) 5.75
0.8
1.47
0.7
608.1 000*** 5.65
0.8
1.30
0.5
429.3 000***
Sad (“zielig”) 3.23
1.3
5.75
0.8
131.4 000*** 2.90
1.4
6.15
0.5
94.8 000***
Moving (“aangrijpend”) 2.47
1.3
5.88
0.7
246.5 000*** 3.70
1.4
6.35
0.7
59.6 000***
Intense (“heftig”) 1.69
0.6
5.59
1.0
458.7 000*** 1.80
1.0
5.80
1.0
158.3 000***
Complicated (“ingewikkeld”) 1.56
0.6
3.31
1.3
58.8 000*** 1.35
0.6
3.60
1.2
57.7 000***
Beautiful (“mooi”) 4.75
0.9
4.81
1.2
0.0 828 5.20
1.0
4.85
1.2
1.0 319
Interesting (“interessant”) 4.13
1.0
5.44
0.9
26.3 000*** 4.30
1.3
5.75
0.9
17.4 000***
Exciting (“spannend”) 2.97
1.2
4.57
1.0
48.2 000*** 2.80
1.5
5.10
1.0
31.9 000***
Boring (“saai”) 1.75
0.8
2.26
1.2
3.7 063 1.85
1.0
1.80
0.7
0.0 854
F-tests reflect differences in rating of Happy Feet and Sophie’s Choice clips, analyzed within-participants in the EEG study and between-participants in the behavioral
experiment. ***p < 0.001.
the pre-experiment measurement) or “during the preceding read-
ing block,” using 25 common state adjectives and a 7 point
scale ranging from 1 = totally not to 7 = very much. Mood
was quantified as the average score across ten strongly valenced
state adjectives: Dutch vrolijk, tevreden, opgewekt, positief, goed,
and negatief, verdrietig, somber, down, slecht (approximate trans-
lations: cheerful, content, good-humored, positive, good, and neg-
ative, sad, gloomy, down, bad), after recoding all scales to a
single dimension running from −3 (negative) to 3 (positive).
Cronbach’s alpha of this 10-item scale was 0.91, and the items
were interspersed with 15 other state adjectives (Dutch relaxed,
zenuwachtig, actief, ontspannen, geconcentreerd, afgeleid, geïrri-
teerd, vermoeid, gemotiveerd, nieuwsgierig, geïnteresseerd, bang,
onzeker, zelfverzekerd, and ongemakkelijk; approximate transla-
tions: relaxed, nervous, active, relaxed, focused, distracted, irritated,
tired, motivated, curious, interested, scared, insecure, self-assured,
and uncomfortable), partly to avoid a focus on strongly valenced
moods.
PROCEDURE
Participants were contacted and screened via email, and filled out
the PANAS and IRI as part of that. They then came to the lab twice
to take part in “an EEG experiment in which they would be per-
forming two alternating tasks (watching short movie fragments
and reading short texts), aimed to find out how well women can
combine these two tasks and whether that depends on the type of
movie they are actually watching.” Sessions were approximately 1
week apart and always took place at the same time of the day, with
half of the participants having the positive mood induction first,
and the other half having the negative mood induction first.
In each session, participants were comfortably seated in a nor-
mally lit room where, after electrode application, instructions,
and a 10-story practice session, they first filled out the brief self-
report questionnaire. Then, for each of 5 blocks, participants saw
a film clip, then read 24 stories, subsequently filled out the self-
report questionnaire again, and then had a short pause, until they
felt ready for the next block. Participants were asked to focus on
the story laid out by the five film clips, and to relax and avoid
strong movement during those clips “for EEG measurement.”
They were also asked to read the texts for comprehension (while
avoiding blinks), and to ignore occasional errors. After reading a
text, presentation of the next one could be initiated by the partic-
ipant via a button-press. After the fifth block, participants filled
out a brief 10-item film-rating questionnaire, and had a short
post-session interview with the experimenter (with final debrief-
ing after session 2). A single block lasted about 15min, and an
entire session lasted about 2.5–3 h.
Stories were presented in black 30 point Tahoma font on a
white background on a fast TFT display positioned at about 80 cm
distance. Each trial started with a 1000-ms “∗∗∗” warning sig-
nal followed by a 500-ms centered fixation cross, after which the
stories were presented word by word at the same position. As in
the 2007 study, we used a variable serial visual presentation pro-
cedure in which the duration of each word depended on length
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and sentence position, using parameters based on natural reading
times, a subjective assessment of the naturalness of the result-
ing presentation, and constraints imposed by the 75Hz video
refresh rate. Non-critical word duration consisted of a standard
offset of 187ms, and an additional 27ms per letter (with an upper
bound of 8 letters for each word; range 241–403ms), clause-final
words with a comma or period sign were prolonged by an addi-
tional 200 or 293ms, respectively, and the screen went blank for
106ms between words and for a 1000ms between sentences. To
avoid spurious ERP effects due to accidental differences in aver-
age word length across conditions (and, hence, shifted offset and
onset potentials), the critical word, the preceding word and the
two words following it were presented with a fixed duration of
318ms, based on the average critical word length across all stories.
Participants did not notice the alternation between completely
variable and semi-fixed word duration presentation.
EEG-RECORDING, PREPROCESSING, AND ANALYSIS
EEG was recorded from 34 ActiCap active electrodes
(BrainProducts, Germany) at standard 10–20 positions in
an elastic cap, each referenced to the left mastoid, and with
impedances kept below 20 k. Signals were amplified with
BrainAmps DC amplifiers (0.1–100Hz band-pass), digitized
at 500Hz, re-referenced off-line to the mastoid average, and
low-pass filtered at 35Hz (24 dB/oct). Additional bipolar hEOG
and vEOG signals were computed from F9-F10 and from Fp1-V1
(an additional electrode below the left eye) respectively. Segments
ranging from 200ms before to 1000ms after critical word onset
were extracted and baseline-corrected to a 200-ms pre-onset
baseline. Segments with EEG or EOG signals exceeding ±75µV,
a voltage step of over 50µV per ms, or extremely low activity
(maximum amplitude difference below 0.5µV for at least
100ms) were rejected, and the data of 17 participants with over
50% segment loss, on 36 segments per condition, in any condi-
tion of any of their two recording sessions, were excluded. For
the remaining 32 participants, average segment loss was 11.4%
in positive mood sessions and 11.4%, in negative mood sessions,
with no asymmetry across sentence type. Remaining segments
were averaged per participant, mood induction (positive vs.
negative), sentence type (implicit causality vs. syntax), critical
word type (unexpected vs. expected, based on implicit causality
bias or syntactic agreement), and 6-electrode scalp recording
quadrant (left-anterior: F3, F7, F9, FC1, FC5, FT9; right-anterior:
F4, F8, F10, FC2, FC6, FT10; left-posterior: CP1, CP5, P3, P7,
O1, PO9; right-posterior: CP2, CP6, P4, P8, O2, PO10). Mean
amplitude values were analyzed with repeated-measures mood ×
critical word type × hemisphere × anterior-posterior ANOVAs
in consecutive 100-ms latency ranges, using Greenhouse–
Geisser/Box’s epsilon correction for univariate F-tests with two or
more df.
EEG EXPERIMENT: RESULTS
FILM RATINGS
Post-experiment evaluations of clips drawn from Happy Feet
and Sophie’s Choice are displayed in Table 1 (left half, EEG
experiment). As intended, Happy Feet attracted stronger positive
(“cheerful,” “funny”) ratings than Sophie’s Choice, and Sophie’s
Choice attracted stronger negative (“sad,” “moving,” “intense”)
ratings than Happy Feet.
AGGREGATED MOOD RATINGS
As displayed in Table 2 (left half, EEG experiment), participants
reported a moderately good mood when they came into the
lab, and comparably so in both sessions. Subsequent positive
mood induction with Happy Feet clips caused them to maintain
their good mood throughout the experiment, whereas negative
Table 2 | Self-reported mood score means (bold) and standard deviations (regular) before and during the EEG experiment (left) or the
behavioral post-test (right), on a 7-point aggregated scale (−3, maximally negative; 0, neutral; +3, maximally positive).
Global mood rating (−3 =
negative, +3 = positive)
EEG experiment Behavioral experiment
Happy
Feet
Sophie’s
Choice
F (1, 30) p Happy
Feet
Sophie’s
Choice
F (1, 38) p
Mood before induction 1.63
0.57
1.69
0.57
0.68 418 1.77
0.68
1.81
0.64
0.05 831
Mood at end of block 1 1.76
0.54
0.94
0.86
51.37 000*** 1.85
0.70
0.96
1.16
8.69 005**
Mood at end of block 2 1.69
0.60
0.99
0.94
43.72 000*** 1.78
0.68
0.98
1.07
7.92 008**
Mood at end of block 3 1.59
0.68
1.23
0.71
21.77 000*** 1.59
0.81
1.09
1.03
2.91 096
Mood at end of block 4 1.76
0.62
1.11
0.92
54.25 000*** 1.89
0.65
1.12
0.95
9.04 005**
Mood at end of block 5 1.80
0.55
1.05
0.82
87.95 000*** 1.85
0.73
1.04
0.95
8.81 005**
Avg. mood across block 1–5 1.72
0.55
1.06
0.79
97.23 000*** 1.79
0.67
1.03
0.98
8.13 007**
F-tests reflect differences in ratings for sessions involving Happy Feet or Sophie’s Choice clips. ***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01.
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mood induction with Sophie’s Choice clips caused their mood to
deteriorate in all blocks.
OTHER CURRENT STATE RATINGS
In sessions with Sophie’s Choice clips, participants judged them-
selves to be somewhat less relaxed [SC: 4.96 vs. HF: 5.23, F(1, 30) =
6.10, p = 0.019], slightly more nervous [SC: 1.65 vs. HF: 1.42,
F(1, 30) = 5.32, p = 0.028], marginally more scared [SC: 1.41 vs.
HF: 1.22, F(1, 30) = 3.95, p = 0.056] and marginally less self-
assured [SC: 4.78 vs. HF: 4.96, F(1, 30) = 3.10, p = 0.088]. No
other differences were significant (all p-values > 0.100).
EEG: EARLY COMPONENTS ELICITED BY CRITICAL WORDS
To assess the impact of mood on early attention-sensitive visual
stimulus processes indexed by the N1 and P2, we extracted
mean amplitudes in the latency range of 100–130ms for the
N1, and 160–190ms for the P2, with latency ranges centered
around N1 and P2 peak amplitudes at Pz and Oz, and across
all critical words. Mood did not affect either component [N1:
F(1, 31) = 0.03, MSE = 77.44, p = 0.869, and P2: F(1, 31) = 0.73,
MSE = 47.84, p = 0.399, tested across 19 posterior electrodes;
N1: F(1, 31) = 0.13, MSE = 39.40, p = 0.722, and P2: F(1, 31) =
1.27,MSE = 72.11, p = 0.268, tested across all electrodes].
EEG: IMPLICIT CAUSALITY ITEMS
Figure 1 displays the grand average ERP waveforms to pronouns
that are consistent or inconsistent with the verb-based implicit
causality bias, after positive and negative mood induction.We had
predicted a widely distributed ERP positivity to bias-inconsistent
pronouns after positive mood induction, at least around 400–
700ms, relative to bias-consistent pronouns. The waveforms in
Figure 1’s top panel and the associated statistics confirm this pre-
diction. For positive mood induction sessions, mean-amplitude
quadrant ANOVAs revealed a small but reliable bias incon-
sistency effect in the latency ranges of 400–500ms [F(1, 31) =
5.34, MSE = 4.19, p = 0.028], and 500–600ms [F(1, 31) = 8.53,
MSE = 4.81, p = 0.006] only. Neither of these effects differed
as a function of anteriority, hemisphere, or the two consid-
ered together (all p-values > 0.600). Marginal bias inconsistency
effects with p-values < 0.100 were found in the latency ranges
of 100–200ms [F(1, 31) = 3.50, MSE = 4.07, p = 0.071], and
900–1000ms [F(1, 31) = 3.89, MSE = 4.64, p = 0.058]; no other
100-ms latency range revealed a reliable inconsistency effect (all
p-values > 0.100).
Importantly, current ideas about how negative mood affects
the use of heuristics led us to predict that negative mood
induction would attenuate or perhaps even eliminate the pos-
itivity elicited by bias-inconsistent pronouns. As can be seen
in Figure 1’s bottom panel, this is indeed what we observed.
In those latency ranges where the bias inconsistency effect had
emerged under positive mood induction (400–500 and 500–
600ms), negative mood induction led to a reliable attenuation
of the inconsistency effect [mood by consistency interaction,
400–500ms: F(1, 31) = 6.19, MSE = 3.91, p = 0.018, and 500–
600ms: F(1, 31) = 13.81, MSE = 4.59, p = 0.001]. Furthermore,
under negative mood induction, simple main effects did not
reveal a reliable inconsistency-induced positive ERP deflection in
these latency ranges [400–500ms: F(1, 31) = 0.92, MSE = 5.38,
p = 0.346; 500–600ms: F(1, 31) = 3.83, MSE = 6.16, p = 0.059;
the latter trend involves a negative deflection]1.
Under negative mood induction, bias-inconsistent pronouns
elicited an unexpected negativity in the latency ranges of
200–300ms [F(1, 31) = 6.39, MSE = 2.40, p = 0.017], and 300–
400ms [F(1, 31) = 5.13, MSE = 3.03, p = 0.031], larger over the
right than over the left hemisphere [200–300: F(1, 31) = 4.19,
MSE = 0.62, p = 0.049; 300–400: F(1, 31) = 3.06, MSE = 0.56,
p = 0.090]. ERP effects in these latency ranges did not differ as
a function of anteriority, or anteriority and hemisphere consid-
ered together (all p-values > 0.200). No other 100-ms latency
range revealed a reliable inconsistency main effect (all p-values
> 0.100), but subsequent hemisphere by inconsistency inter-
actions, in the latency ranges of 400–500ms [F(1, 31) = 12.70,
MSE = 0.50, p = 0.001], 500–600ms [F(1, 31) = 19.79, MSE =
0.37, p < 0.001], 600–700ms [F(1, 31) = 7.25, MSE = 0.59, p =
0.011], 800–900ms [F(1, 31) = 6.01, MSE = 0.59, p = 0.020],
and 900–1000ms [F(1, 31) = 10.09, MSE = 0.39, p = 0.003], do
reveal a hemispheric asymmetry in the ERP effect elicited by
bias-inconsistency.
EEG: SYNTAX ITEMS
Figure 2 displays the grand average ERP waveforms to verbs
that respected or violated a syntactic subject-verb agreement
rule, after positive and negative mood induction. Syntactic viola-
tions elicited a widely distributed but posteriorly dominant P600
effect in both mood conditions, with a (descriptively) slightly
later onset in the negative mood condition. In line with this, a
combined analysis of variance revealed reliable main effects of
syntactic anomaly in 600–700ms [F1,31 = 16.55, MSE = 9.97,
p < 0.001], 700–800ms [F1,31 = 20.67,MSE = 7.27, p < 0.001],
800–900ms [F1,31 = 19.17, MSE = 8.31, p < 0.001], and 900–
1000ms [F1,31 = 19.25,MSE = 7.41, p < 0.001]. No main effect
of syntactic anomaly emerged in the 500–600ms latency range
[F(1, 31) = 2.51,MSE = 9.16, p = 0.123], nor in any of the earlier
latency ranges (all p-values > 0.300).
Importantly, mood induction did not reliably affect the size of
the P600 anomaly effect in any of these P600 effect latency ranges
[500–600ms: F(1, 31) = 2.31, MSE = 7.23, p = 0.139, 600–
700ms: F(1, 31) = 0.73, MSE = 8.80, p = 0.398, 700–800ms:
F(1, 31) = 1.93, MSE = 8.20, p = 0.175, 800–900ms: F(1, 31) =
1.03, MSE = 4.89, p = 0.318, and 900–1000ms: F(1, 31) = 0.09,
MSE = 6.90, p = 0.764]. Pooling mean amplitudes across the
entire 500–1000ms latency range also did not lead to a signif-
icant P600 effect size difference [mood by anomaly: F(1, 31) =
1.33, MSE = 5.59, p = 0.257], and merely resulted in a highly
reliable main effect [F(1, 31) = 19.10, MSE = 6.21, p < 0.001].
1Our logic critically hinges on the presence of a bias inconsistency ERP effect
in particular latency ranges (expected around 400–700ms, Van Berkum et al.,
2007) in a positive mood. We examined the mood-induced attenuation of
that specific ERP effect by testing for the mood by consistency interaction in
the relevant latency ranges, rather than by solely relying on a non-significant
bias inconsistency effect with negative mood (cf. Nieuwenhuis et al., 2011).
However, in the absence of a reliable bias inconsistency ERP effect with pos-
itive mood in other latency ranges, a test for mood-induced attenuation in
those other latency ranges would be ill-defined.
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FIGURE 1 | Implicit causality. ERPs to pronouns that are consistent (black) or inconsistent (red) with the implicit causality bias of a preceding verb, after
positive (top) or negative (bottom) mood induction. Signals are arranged quasi-topographically, with negative voltage up and onset of the pronoun at 0ms.
Furthermore, mood did not affect the laterality of the P600 effect
in any of the relevant latency ranges (all p-values > 0.300), nor
did it affect its distribution over the anterior-posterior axis (all
p-values> 0.400). Minor distributional differences (see Figure 3)
gave rise to reliable mood by anomaly by hemisphere by poste-
riority interactions in the 500–600ms latency range [F(1, 31) =
4.65, MSE = 0.27, p = 0.039] and the 800–900ms latency range
[F(1, 31) = 4.43,MSE = 0.24, p = 0.044], as well as to a marginal
interaction in the 700–800ms latency range [F(1, 31) = 3.27,
MSE = 0.20, p = 0.080; all p-values > 0.100 in the other latency
ranges].
Mood induction did interact with syntactic anomaly in two
earlier latency ranges: 300–400ms [F(1, 31) = 6.10, MSE = 4.34,
p = 0.019], and 400–500ms [F(1, 31) = 6.79, MSE = 4.86, p =
0.014]. This can be traced to small negative syntactic anomaly
effects in these latency ranges [300–400ms: F(1, 31) = 7.11,
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FIGURE 2 | Syntax. ERPs to syntactically well-formed (black) or anomalous (red) verbs, after positive (top) or negative (bottom) mood induction. Onset of the
verb at 0ms, other graphics details as in Figure 1.
MSE = 3.30, p = 0.012; 400–500ms: F(1, 31) = 6.01, MSE =
5.25, p = 0.020] under negative mood induction, but not under
positive mood induction [300–400ms: F(1, 31) = 0.91, MSE =
6.50, p = 0.348; 400–500ms: F(1, 31) = 1.06, MSE = 5.93, p =
0.310].
Figure 3 displays scalp distributions of the observed effects to
bias-inconsistent pronouns and syntactic agreement violations,
and can serve as an interim summary of our findings. In line
with our predictions, we replicate the Van Berkum et al. (2007)
result, a widely distributed positivity around 400–700ms to bias-
inconsistent pronouns, in positive mood sessions, and we see no
such positivity to bias-inconsistent pronouns in negative mood
sessions. Also in line with our predictions, we see a widely dis-
tributed large P600 effect to syntactic anomalies in both mood
conditions. In negative mood sessions, we also obtain two addi-
tional effects that we did not predict: a right-dominant negativity
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FIGURE 3 | ERP effects to implicit causality bias inconsistency and
syntactic anomaly. Scalp distributions of grand average differential
ERP effects to bias-inconsistent (vs. -consistent) pronouns, and to
syntactically anomalous (vs. correct) verbs, for ten 100-ms latency
ranges after critical word onset, in positive and negative mood
induction sessions.
to bias-inconsistent pronouns first emerging around 200–400ms,
and a more symmetrical, posteriorly dominant negativity to
syntactic anomalies around 300–500ms.
EEG: PARTICIPANTS WITH SUFFICIENT MOODSHIFT
Before interpreting the above, we need to consider the fact that
ourmovie clipmanipulation did not affect all participants equally
effectively. To explore this, we separately examined the data for
participants whose self-reported mood after positive vs. negative
mood induction, quantified on the overall 10-item mood scale
and pooled across 5 experimental blocks, differed by at least half
a scale point in the right direction. In the resulting group (N =
16, of which 7 with positive, and 9 with negative mood induction
first), average mood score differed by an average 1.19 scale points
(1.76 vs. 0.57 for positive vs. negative mood induction) [F(1, 15) =
116.76, p < 0.001].
As shown in Figure 4, for those participants where the mood
manipulation worked as intended, the ERP findings for implicit
causality are as predicted: a reliable globally distributed ERP
positivity to bias-inconsistent pronouns in the latency ranges
of 400–500ms [F(1, 15) = 8.73, MSE = 4.44, p = 0.010] and
500–600ms [F(1, 15) = 7.25, MSE = 4.08, p = 0.017] after pos-
itive mood induction, no such ERP positivity [400–500ms:
F(1, 15) = 0.01, MSE = 3.97, p = 0.921; 500–600ms: F(1, 15) =
2.07, MSE = 8.38, p = 0.171] after negative mood induction
(nor any other reliable ERP effects in any other latency range,
all p-values > 0.100), and reliably different inconsistency effects
in these two moods [mood by inconsistency interaction, 400–
500ms: F(1, 15) = 9.52, MSE = 2.17, p = 0.008; 500–600ms:
F(1, 15) = 13.10, MSE = 3.52, p = 0.003]. These are exactly the
findings one would expect if a positive mood leads people
to use implicit causality information to anticipate upcom-
ing referents, and if a negative mood abolishes such heuristic
anticipation.
Furthermore, mood had only a limited effect on the P600 effect
elicited by syntactic anomalies. A reliable positivity emerged as
a main effect across mood in the latency ranges of 500–600ms
and beyond (all p-values < 0.050), with the size of this P600
effect not depending on mood in any of these latency ranges (all
p-values> 0.200), but with two mood by anomaly interactions in
the 300–400 and 400–500ms latency range (p = 0.047 and 0.031,
respectively), reflecting the visible earlier onset of the positivity
for those in a positive mood. The N1 and P2 components were
not affected by mood [N1: F(1, 15) = 0.02, MSE = 20.14, p =
0.902, and P2: F(1, 15) = 0.00, MSE = 44.25, p = 0.985, across
19 posterior electrodes; N1: F(1, 15) = 0.05, MSE = 45.17, p =
0.834, and P2: F(1, 15) = 0.00,MSE = 78.20, p = 0.989, across all
electrodes].
The critical waveforms in Figure 4, obtained with implicit
causality under a positive mood, begin to differentiate early, with
traces of a posterior positivity already in the 100–200ms latency
range. Although not reliably different in the statistics, such early
differential trends could signal a problem with ERP baseline cor-
rection, caused by differential effects to the preceding word. We
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FIGURE 4 | ERP effects for implicit causality and syntax, for
mood-responsive participants only. Scalp distributions of differential ERP
effects to bias-inconsistent (vs. -consistent) pronouns and syntactically
anomalous (vs. correct) verbs, and associated ERPs, for participants whose
self-reported mood shifted at least half a scale point in the intended
direction.
examined this possibility by analyzing ERPs elicited by the pre-
ceding word “omdat” (“because”), presented 428ms before the
critical pronoun. As visible in Figure 5, our critical effects are
clearly tied to the differential status of the subsequent pronoun—
no differential effects were elicited by “omdat” in the two relevant
item conditions, in either mood.
It is important to understand why only half of our 32 par-
ticipants displayed a sufficient change in mood upon viewing
Sophie’s Choice vs. Happy Feet clips, and why the rest did not.
Part of the variability in how our manipulation affected the par-
ticipants might have come about because of accidental differences
in pre-experiment mood. At the start of their positive or negative
mood induction sessions (so before seeing Happy Feet or Sophie’s
Choice later in the session), the mood-responsive group did not
differ on 10-item baseline mood [before HF: 1.75, before SC:
1.63, F(1, 15) = 0.85, p = 0.372, 10-item scale]. In the remaining
group, however, participants arrived with a reliably better mood
at sessions where they would see Sophie’s Choice than at sessions
where they would see Happy Feet [before HF: 1.50, before SC:
1.76, F(1, 15) = 5.80, p = 0.029]. This will to some extent have
counteracted the manipulation.
Furthermore, an examination of the 15 self-report state
parameters not captured in the 10-item overall mood scale
revealed a qualitatively different pattern of self-reported state
changes in these two groups. In the mood-responsive group,
presenting Sophie’s Choice instead of Happy Feet had a substan-
tial effect on many parameters: these participants reported feeling
less relaxed [probed via two items, “relaxed”: F(1, 15) = 12.02, p =
0.003; “ontspannen”: F(1, 15) = 17.58, p = 0.001], less focused
[F(1, 15) = 5.28, p = 0.036], less motivated [F(1, 15) = 7.76, p =
0.014], less self-assured [F(1, 15) = 6.62, p = 0.021], more ner-
vous [F(1, 15) = 8.78, p = 0.010], more afraid [F(1, 15) = 5.22,
p = 0.037], marginally more uncomfortable [F(1, 15) = 3.69, p =
0.074], and marginally less active [F(1, 15) = 3.54, p = 0.079]. In
the remaining group, however, presenting Sophie’s Choice instead
of Happy Feet did not reliably affect any of the 15 state param-
eters, apart from a slight decrease in irritation [F(1, 15) = 4.39,
p = 0.054; all other p-values > 0.100]. If anything, this suggests
that Happy Feet, our intended positive mood inducer, actually
irritated participants in this group, at least more so than Sophie’s
Choice. Furthermore, in this group, the two movies had no other
detectable effects on self-reportable states.
What might have caused these differences in response style?
The two groups did not reliably differ on age [F(1, 31) = 0.28,
p = 0.600], positive PANAS score [F(1, 31) = 0.25, p = 0.624],
negative PANAS score [F(1, 31) = 1.10, p = 0.303], or the IRI
subscales EC [F(1, 31) = 0.72, p = 0.403] and PD [F(1, 31) =
0.73, p = 0.788]. However, one difference between the groups
approached significance: people in the mood-responsive group
had marginally higher scores on the IRI Fantasy scale than those
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FIGURE 5 | ERP effects for implicit causality items, time-locked to
the pre-critical word. Scalp distributions of differential ERP effects to
bias-inconsistent (vs. -consistent) pronouns, in 100-ms latency ranges,
time-locked and baseline-corrected to the preceding word “omdat,” for
participants whose self-reported mood shifted at least half a scale
point.
in the remaining group [20.7 vs. 17.7; F(1, 31) = 3.60, p = 0.068].
Also, across all 32 participants, IRI Fantasy scores correlated sig-
nificantly with self-reported mood after having seen Sophie’s
Choice (r = 0.40, p = 0.025), but not after having seen Happy
Feet (r = −0.16, p = 0.386). It appears, therefore, that those par-
ticipants who, as part of their general self-reported response style,
tend to more strongly feel for, or feel along with, fictional char-
acters in movies, novels, and plays were more sensitive to clips
from Sophie’s Choice than participants who score low on the IRI
Fantasy scale. Higher IRI Fantasy scores in the mood-responsive
group may well be part of the reason why Sophie’s Choice worked
as intended, inducing a large overall mood shift on the 10-item
aggregate scale, as well as a large number of other state changes
that are consistent with the intended effect of this movie (such
as feeling less relaxed and more nervous). Conversely, lower IRI
Fantasy scores in the remaining group may well be part of the
reason why Sophie’s Choice did not have the intended effect there,
andmay actually have had uncontrolled other effects, such as feel-
ing slightly less irritated over Sophie’s Choice relative to Happy
Feet, instead of feeling worse.
SUMMARY
In all, the results of the EEG study can be summarized as fol-
lows. Self-report measures indicate that the movie-based mood
manipulation is not equally effective for all 32 participants, pre-
sumably in part because of individual differences in narrative
transportation (Green, 2004), the degree to which people feel
for, or feel along with, characters in Sophie’s Choice. But partici-
pants whose self-report measures indicate a reliable deterioration
of mood after having seen Sophie’s Choice, relative to having
seen Happy Feet, display the ERP results we had predicted. In
particular, the relevant ERP traces suggest that participants used
implicit causality information associated with verbs like “praise”
and “apologize” to anticipate who would initially be referred to
in a subsequent clause when they were in a good mood, but not
(or at least not noticeably so) when they were in a bad mood.
Furthermore, in the same participants, a deterioration of mood
delayed their response to syntactic agreement violations to some
extent, but it did not in the end lead to a substantially smaller
P600 effect. In all, our data suggest that under the conditions
tested here, a bad mood selectively eliminates the heuristic antici-
pation of referents, while leaving subject-verb number agreement
processing more or less intact.
STORY COMPLETION EXPERIMENT
This result raises an interesting issue. Are readers in a bad mood
generally less biased when reading implicit causality verbs? If so,
then one would expect them to also give less biased completions
of, say, “David praised Linda because . . . ” in a story completion
test. Alternatively, perhaps a bad mood affects some real-time
aspect of language comprehension, such as the ability or inclina-
tion to bring the implicit causality bias to bear sufficiently rapidly
to predict who will be referred to right after “because,” as the
sentence is unfolding. We suspected the latter to be more likely,
and conducted a behavioral follow-up experiment to decide the
issue. We used the same mood induction, but we truncated our
implicit causality items after “because,” and asked new partici-
pants to complete those stories while using Dutch “he” or “she,”
so that we could compute the bias supplied by the verb in those
conditions. If a negative mood causes readers to perceive these
verbs as less biased, the average verb bias should be lower than
the bias observed with a positive mood, and also less than the
88% average bias observed in our mood-neutral pretest (or the
90% observed in the mood-neutral pretest associated with the
Van Berkum et al., 2007 findings). Alternatively, if the mean bias
ratings end up around the earlier 88–90%, independent of mood,
we can infer that the attenuated ERP response to bias-inconsistent
pronouns observed with a negative mood is not the result of a
weaker bias as such.
PARTICIPANTS
The behavioral experiment was conducted with 40 right-handed
female native speakers of Dutch who all met the same partici-
pant selection criteria as used for the EEG experiment, and who
all gave informed consent in accordance with the Declaration
of Helsinki. For practical reasons, mood induction was manip-
ulated as a between-participants factor, with random assign-
ment of participants to either condition. The two groups of 20
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participants in positive vs. negative mood induction were compa-
rable on mean age (21.6 vs. 21.0 years; ranges 18–30 and 18–25),
mean positive PANAS (33.2 vs. 34.5; ranges 27–41 and 28–44) and
mean negative PANAS score (18.7 vs. 18.8; ranges 14–31 and 11–
31), mean IRI FS score (2.7 vs. 2.5, ranges 1.1–3.7 and 1.6–3.4),
IRI EC score (2.7 vs. 2.6, ranges 2.1–4.0 and 1.3–3.7), and IRI PD
score (1.6 vs. 1.8, ranges 0.7–2.1 and 0.7–3.0).
MATERIALS AND PROCEDURE
At stake was the off-line processing of implicit causality in a
positive and negative mood. We therefore only used the origi-
nal 144 three-sentence mini-stories constructed for that part of
the design, and disregarded the agreement violation materials. All
stories were truncated after (the Dutch equivalent of) “because”,
and presented in its two character order variants, to different
participants always:
(3) Joe Biden and Sarah Palin prepared for a very important
debate. They were both nervous, as this debate would cer-
tainly affect the elections. Sarah feared Joe [Joe feared Sarah]
because . . .
Stories were presented in the same order as in the EEG study,
reusing the original randomizations while stripping them of all
agreement-oriented items. Apart from the presence of a response
task and the absence of EEG-related recording, the entire pro-
cedure (including mood induction, self-report, and trial timing)
was identical to that in the EEG study. Also, stories were presented
in the same manner as before, using identical word durations.
The final word “omdat” (“because”) remained on the screen until
participants began typing, and all typed responses were recorded
verbatim on file. As in the original materials pretest, instruc-
tions asked participants to read each story attentively but to then
immediately complete it with the first short completion that came
to mind, using (Dutch equivalents of) “he” or “she,” the latter
intended as singular. Typed responses were automatically coded
as consistent or inconsistent with the implicit causality verb bias.
A single block lasted about 15–20min, and an entire session lasted
about 2–2.5 h.
FILM AND MOOD RATINGS
As in the EEG study, Happy Feet attracted stronger positive
(“cheerful,” “funny”) ratings than Sophie’s Choice, and Sophie’s
Choice attracted stronger negative (“sad”) ratings than Happy
Feet, see Table 1 (right half, behavioral experiment). Also, as dis-
played in Table 2 (right half, behavioral experiment), the impact
of mood induction was like that in the EEG study: participants
reported a moderately good mood when they came into the
lab, subsequent positive mood induction with Happy Feet clips
caused them to maintain their good mood throughout the exper-
iment, and negative mood induction with Sophie’s Choice clips
caused their mood to deteriorate in all blocks. In addition, those
who had seen Sophie’s Choice clips judged themselves to feel
a little more uncomfortable [SC: 2.31 vs. HF: 1.47, F(1, 38) =
6.91, p = 0.012], marginally more nervous [SC: 1.69 vs. HF:
1.31, F(1, 38) = 3.06, p = 0.088] and marginally less relaxed [SC:
4.86 vs. HF: 5.38, F(1, 38) = 3.52, p = 0.068]. No other differences
were significant (all p-values > 0.100).
STORY COMPLETIONS
Participants in both groups produced equally biased story
completions, with on average 90% (SD 4%, range 80–96%)
bias-consistent story completions in the positive mood induc-
tion condition, and 91% (SD 4%, range 82–97%) in the negative
mood induction condition [F(1, 38) = 0.41, MSE = 19.00, p =
0.525].
STORY COMPLETIONS WHEN MATCHED TO MOOD-RESPONSIVE EEG
GROUP TRAITS
Because our focus in the EEG study is on participants for whom
the movie manipulation worked as intended, we conducted an
additional “mood-matched” analysis of the story completion
data. To achieve this, we removed the data of the 6 “best-mood”
participants in the negative mood induction group (all scoring
over 1.69 on the 10-item mood scale across 5 reading blocks),
and the 6 “worst-mood” participants in the positive mood induc-
tion group (all scoring below 1.59), from our current analysis.
Of the remaining 28 participants, those shown clips of Happy
Feet reported being in a much better mood than those shown
Sophie’s Choice clips, in every block, as well as averaged across
all five blocks [average mood score after HF: 2.12, after SC: 0.55;
between-participants F(1, 26) = 53.54, MSE = 0.32, p < 0.001].
Importantly, and as in the earlier all-participants analysis, partic-
ipants in both groups produced equally biased story completions,
with on average 90% (SD 4%, range 83–96%) bias-consistent
story completions in the positive mood induction condition, and
91% (SD 4%, range 82–97%) in the negative mood induction
condition [F(1, 26) = 0.11,MSE = 17.09, p = 0.747].
Interestingly, participants in the positive mood induction
group produced marginally longer sentence completions than
participants in the negative mood induction group [6.3 vs. 5.6
words, sd = 1.15 vs. 0.81, range = 4.8–9.0 words vs. 4.1–6.6
words, respectively; F(1, 26) = 3.12, MSE = 0.99, p = 0.089], for
the exact same materials, and under the same task demands (“be
short”). Also, across all 28 participants, self-reported mood across
the five experimental blocks correlated reliably with mean com-
pletion length (Pearson r = 0.41, p = 0.032 two-tailed), whereas
self-reported mood at the start of the experiment did not (Pearson
r = −0.03, p = 0.873 two-tailed). This suggests that an exper-
imentally induced bad mood causes people to be slightly less
“wordy,” at least under current conditions.
DISCUSSION
In two language comprehension experiments, we used implicit
causality phrases such as “Linda praised David because . . . ”
to examine whether a lab-induced bad mood down-regulates
the degree to which readers heuristically anticipate who will
be talked about next. In the EEG study, results were as pre-
dicted, at least for readers whose self-reported mood changed
in the intended way. When the moderately good mood with
which these participants arrived at the lab was preserved, pro-
nouns that were inconsistent with verb-based implicit causal-
ity elicited a clear processing cost, with the same ERP
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signature as reported by Van Berkum et al. (2007). When the
same participants’ mood deteriorated as a result of watching
rather depressing Sophie’s Choice clips, this signature of referen-
tial anticipation disappeared.
A decline in mood did not reliably affect ERP indices of
early stimulus processing (N1 and P2), nor did it lead to a reli-
ably smaller P600 response to syntactic anomalies. The absence
of referential anticipation in a bad mood can therefore not be
attributed to our participants tuning out, being distracted to such
an extent that they no longer focused on the texts. Also, mood
did not affect the use of the implicit causality heuristic when par-
ticipants were asked to provide a continuation and were given
enough time to think about it in a behavioral experiment. This
suggests that the mood-induced failure to use this heuristic to
anticipate reference in the EEG study is specific to the real-time
demands of reading along with rapidly unfolding text, without
additional task demands.
WHAT EXACTLY DID WE MANIPULATE?
Following earlier mood research available when we designed the
study, we started out with a coarse valencemodel ofmood as good
or bad, and assessed the success of our manipulation on an aggre-
gate mood scale involving 10 strongly valenced mood adjectives.
However, the landscape of mood may well be more articulate and
interesting than that (see Hamann, 2012; Shiota and Kalat, 2012,
for discussion). For example, recent work suggests that although
high-motivation negative affects like disgust, fear or anger tend to
cause a narrower, more focused perspective, low-motivation neg-
ative affects such as sadness actually causes a broader spotlight of
attention (Gable and Harmon-Jones, 2009, 2010).
The 15 additional state adjectives that we used as fillers in
our self-report questionnaire can provide some information on
what the movie clips did to our readers. EEG participants whose
global mood, indexed by our 10-item valence scale, went down at
least half a scale point upon viewing clips from Sophie’s Choice
instead of Happy Feet also reported feeling reliably more ner-
vous, more afraid and less relaxed, as well as less motivated, less
focused, less self-assured, and marginally less active. In the film
ratings, Sophie’s Choice was rated as reliably more exciting and
interesting. But with respect to arousal aspects of the self-report,
the relative impact of Sophie’s Choice is somewhat ambiguous,
with clear hints at increased arousal (increase in nervousness, fear
and insecurity), but also some support for less arousal (decrease
in motivation, and in a feeling of active engagement). Perhaps
the hints at increased arousal are indicative of high motiva-
tional intensity with respect to events depicted in Sophie’s Choice,
whereas hints at decreased arousal reflect reduced motivational
intensity for the reading task; this makes it difficult to relate our
ratings to a single arousal or motivation dimension. The one clear
message that these additional measures do convey is that, regard-
less of what the films did to their arousal, people felt less good
after Sophie’s Choice clips.
While our negative mood induction successfully caused the
mood of these participants to go down in both experiments, pos-
itive mood induction did not make them feel any better than
how they felt when they entered the lab. It seems that although
such clips may come as a pleasant surprise in a psycholinguistic
experiment, they don’t really cheer people up. This is consistent
with the fact that the ERP effect elicited by bias-inconsistent pro-
nouns after positive mood induction is of similar size as the effect
we obtained to the same materials without mood induction (Van
Berkum et al., 2007).
We selected Sophie’s Choice and Happy Feet to manipulate
mood because these movies have frequently been used in mood
research, and are known to induce sufficiently different moods.
However, besides being cheerful or depressing, the two movies
differed in several other ways. The most obvious difference is that
whereas Happy Feet is an animation featuring talking penguins,
Sophie’s Choice is a realistic piece of human drama. Related, the
events portrayed in the Happy Feet clips that we used are less com-
plex than those in the Sophie’s Choice clips, the traces of which
can be seen in different complexity ratings given by our partici-
pants. We cannot exclude that such differences have an impact on
the reading task, such as via fatigue, or depletion (Baumeister and
Vohs, 2007). However, such an impact may actually be part and
parcel of why Sophie’s Choice puts you down, and Happy Feet
does not. And part of the higher complexity rating of Sophie’s
Choice may well reflect the emotional complexity of depressing
interpersonal interactions. For the time being, the most parsi-
monious interpretation of how participants were affected by our
movie clips, supported by the overall 10-item mood scale as well
as the common denominator in other self-rating differences, is
that it changed their mood.
We focused on female readers whose self-reported mood
changed in the intended way, as verified by a self-report global
mood scale, and observed the predicted pattern of ERP results in
this group. In our study, these readers also scored higher on the
IRI Fantasy scale, which taps into their capacity or inclination to
feel for, or feel along with, characters in fictional narrative (Davis,
1983). This suggests that the individual differences in our ERP
results may simply reflect different degrees of sensitivity to the
specific manipulation, a movie, and that the participants whose
mood did not change in the intended way in response to Sophie’s
Choice might turn out to bemore responsive to some other mood
manipulation. We also suspect that an effective manipulation for
men, whether Sophie’s Choice, bad treatment by experimenters,
or seeing one’s favorite soccer team lose, will reveal a similar
pattern of results. These predictions remain to be tested.
WHY DOES MOOD AFFECT REFERENTIAL ANTICIPATION IN READING?
What might be the underlying mechanism linking a bad mood
to a failure to use the implicit causality heuristic in real-time lan-
guage processing? Emotion is generally considered to involve the
synchronous, interrelated recruitment of several brain-body sys-
tems (Damasio, 1996, 2010; Scherer, 2005; Frijda, 2007; Shiota
and Kalat, 2012), including perceptual and cognitive systems
needed for unconscious and conscious (re)appraisal of the situ-
ation, the autonomous nervous system, the neuro-endocrine sys-
tem, the somatic nervous system involved in motor control, and
various processes that allow people to become subjectively aware
of at least some of their bodily changes, giving rise to “feelings.”
Although slower-acting, less event-tied, and usually less intense
(Scherer, 2005), changes in mood presumably involve a simi-
larly rich set of changes, as such offering multiple sites via which
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cognition and action can be affected. In spite of the attractive-
ness of simple models, therefore, we think it is unlikely that mood
simply involves adjustment of a single parameter of mind. Rather,
the default hypothesis should be that mood involves the simul-
taneous tuning of multiple different parameters of our mental
architecture, which collectively reconfigure perception, cognition,
and action into particular modes. The language comprehen-
sion processes studied here also involve a complex orchestration
of multiple systems, depending on such diverse operations as
memory retrieval, sentence-level unification, dynamic situation
modeling, anticipation, and context-dependent inferencing. The
implication of all this complexity is that there is bound to bemore
than one route via which a change in mood can in principle bring
about the processing effects we see in our EEG study. We dis-
cuss two plausible candidate scenarios, as well as their possible
relation.
The first candidate involves mood-induced changes in the
scope of associative memory retrieval. Relative to a good mood,
a bad mood not only leads to narrower visuo-spatial attention,
but also to a narrower “spotlight” of associative retrieval from
long-term memory, interfering with access to more remote asso-
ciations (Isen et al., 1985; Federmeier et al., 2001; Bolte et al.,
2003; Rowe et al., 2007; Friedman and Förster, 2010). This
effect may be mediated by increased inhibitory control exerted
by medial prefrontal cortex over associative memory retrieval
in medial temporal lobe structures (Bar, 2009). To account for
the absence of referential anticipation in negative mood sessions
of the EEG experiment, we need to assume that the implicit
causality information associated with verbs like “praise” or “apol-
ogize” is sufficiently remotely associated to those verb forms
to—at least under some conditions—fall outside the spotlight
of retrieval. Furthermore, we have to assume that, given the
same retrieval scope, the morpho-syntactic aspects of particular
word forms needed for agreement checking are fully accessible.
Although generated ad-hoc, these are not unreasonable assump-
tions: in the highly constrained domain of syntax, the plural
feature associated with a word form such as “boys” could hardly
be called a remote association, but probabilistic information that
in “X praised Y because . . . ” constructions speakers are more
likely to continue with information on Y than on X can be
construed as “remote.” This makes it conceivable that in a suf-
ficiently bad mood, implicit causality information falls outside
of the spotlight of retrieval, whereas the agreement-relevant fea-
tures needed for syntactic parsing are still sufficiently rapidly
retrieved.
The second candidate scenario involves mood-induced
changes in the effort invested in exploratory cognition. Mood
has a direct impact on the willingness to invest in exploratory,
or otherwise costly behavior. For example, a bad mood causes
people to overestimate the steepness of a hill (Zadra and Clore,
2011), and the chronically negative mood we call depression is
strongly associated with loss of energy and initiative (Davidson
et al., 2002b). Such observations have led people to propose
that mood directly signals the amount of resources available
for exploratory behavior (Zadra and Clore, 2011), with nega-
tive mood signaling low energy, best spent on more conservative
behaviors.
To make this bio-energetic explanation relevant to our results,
one would need to assume that the anticipation of who will be
referred to incurs a greater cost than syntactic parsing, and/or
is somehow more optional. We are unaware of any study that
directly confirms this, but note that syntactic parsing is typi-
cally conceived of as relatively resource-free (“a reflex,” Fodor,
1983), in part because it involves computations in a limited
and highly structured domain. It is not inconceivable that keep-
ing track of referents, and anticipating upcoming referents in
the service of that, is somewhat more costly, possibly because
it requires readers to reach out from the structured linguis-
tic code, into a much more fuzzy, complex discourse world.
Perhaps readers only do this when sufficiently motivated to do
so, based on a trade-off between expected costs and benefits (cf.
Sperber and Wilson, 1995). Such an account would be in line
with the phenomenon—presumably familiar to all of us—that
disinterest or fatigue induces shallower modes of reading, where
syntax and semantics still seem to be doing their job, but do
not seem to lead to a tangible, salient model of the situation
described.
In essence, the bio-energetics account proposes that after hav-
ing seen a negative-mood inducing film like Sophie’s Choice,
people are simply less inclined to invest in exploratory processing
(possibly also because of “ego depletion,” Baumeister and Vohs,
2007), and consequently tune down heuristic referential anticipa-
tion. This account is consistent with recent behavioral evidence
that a bad mood can attenuate the degree to which readers draw
predictive inferences in text (Mirous and Beeman, 2012), and
with N400 evidence that such a mood can also attenuate concep-
tual expectation in sentences and text (Federmeier et al., 2001;
Chwilla et al., 2011, between-category violations; Pinheiro et al.,
2013). However, for reasons currently not well understood, not
all forms of anticipation are tuned by mood (e.g., Federmeier
et al., 2001, within-category violations; Lai et al., 2012). In a way,
this is reassuring, for with prediction increasingly viewed as a
fundamental operating principle that underlies all of the brain’s
functions, including basic perception, motor control, emotion,
and learning (Bar, 2011), one would not want a badmood to shut
down the whole system. Our working assumption, therefore, is
that a bad mood can lead the system to cut back on only some
aspects of anticipatory processing, perhaps because the associa-
tions involved are too remote, or because the process is otherwise
more costly than affordable.
As for the latter, note that in the on-line situation of the
EEG study, the time for prediction in sentences like “X praised
Y because . . . ” is really short. Readers can only begin to generate
implicit causality predictions at the verb, a more precise referen-
tial anticipation can only unfold upon reading about Y, and it
needs to be in place right after “because.” With word durations
ranging between 241 and 403ms, and 106ms separating each
word, there is less than a second for the whole process to unfold.
Furthermore, to the extent that a really precise implicit causality
prediction actually requires the semantics of “because” (but see
Majid et al., 2007; Pyykkönen and Järvikivi, 2010, for evidence
that this is not always necessary), only a few hundredmilliseconds
is available. It is easy to imagine that such time-critical processing
can suffer from slightly less investment of effort.
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In a bio-energetic model, mood-induced adjustments in non-
obligatory (e.g., exploratory) processing can be expected to
depend on the precise trade-off between the costs and bene-
fits of pursuing a certain course of physical or mental action.
In a psycholinguistic experiment, such trade-offs will also be
influenced by how the experiment is perceived, and what task
demands are in place. The latter can explain why negative
mood did not affect performance in the story completion
experiment. After all, participants were specifically asked to
come up with sensible continuations, a task that rendered the
use of verb-based implicit causality information relevant and
profitable.
We think it highly plausible that perceived relevance to the task
at hand can counteract the bio-energetic impact of a bad mood.
In line with this, note that in a bad mood, participants did come
up with story completions that were about 10% shorter. This
selective effect of mood makes sense, as (in contrast to the use
of implicit causality information) wordiness itself is not relevant
to the task at hand—depressed participants may well cut back on
it. In general, we suspect there is a fruitful connection to be made
between bio-energetic effects of mood on language processing on
the one hand, and cost/benefit-oriented models of language com-
prehension such as Relevance Theory (Sperber andWilson, 1995)
on the other.
Finally, the bio-energetic account and the retrieval scope
account can easily be combined into a single coherent story, where
a bad mood reduces the inclination to cognitively explore, such
that less effort is invested in a broad search in long-termmemory,
blocking the sufficiently rapid retrieval of information needed to
extrapolate from, say, “David praised Linda because . . . ” to an
expectation that Linda will soon be referred to. This is a parsi-
monious account for our findings. However, it does not rule out
other causal scenarios. Mood is a complex phenomenon, and so
is language comprehension.
MOOD AND SYNTAX
Our findings on syntactic anomaly suggest that lab-induced
mood has little effect on people’s sensitivity to subject-verb agree-
ment violations: the size of the P600 effect did not reliably differ
in its canonical latency range. However, the ERP traces do suggest
that in a good mood, such agreement violations lead to somewhat
earlier processing costs. Whether this should be interpreted as an
earlier onset of the P600 effect or as something else is not entirely
clear, because the scalp distributions of the early and late positiv-
ity are not entirely identical. Either way, this aspect of the data
could be taken to suggest that, although obviously much more
robust than referential anticipation, agreement checking is not
entirely cost-free, and hence somewhat sensitive—at least in its
timing—to people’s willingness to invest effort.
The relative robustness of the late P600 effect in our study
does conflict with results of Vissers et al. (2010), who found that
negative mood induction caused a complete collapse of the P600
effect to subject-verb agreement violations. We see at least three
differences between the two experiments that might account for
these conflicting findings. First, whereas syntactic violations were
part of slightly more engaging two- to four-sentence discourses
in our study, they featured in isolated sentences in the Vissers
et al. study. Second, we had asked our EEG participants to simply
read for comprehension, while Vissers et al. told their partici-
pants that “questions would be asked about the sentences after
the experiment.” Finally, our syntactic anomalies were embedded
in syntactically and semantically very simple sentence fragments
(e.g., “The boyspl turnssg∗ even the slightest difference of opin-
ion into a bet”), whereas critical sentences in the Vissers et al.
study always involved center-embedded subject- or object-relative
clauses (e.g., The daughtersg that about her parentspl spokepl∗
burstsg suddenly into tears; approximate translation), with distant
agreement controllers as well as local agreement distractors. One
possibility is that under these more complex syntactic conditions,
and in view of the task demands imposed, syntactic processing
becomes somewhat more effortful, and as such more sensitive
to the bio-energetic consequences of a negative mood. Future
research will have to resolve this issue.
CONCLUSION
Although the underlying mechanisms are as yet not entirely
understood, our studies reveal that mood can selectively tune
certain parameters of the language processing architecture, as it
operates in real time. In particular, the experiments show that
under the conditions studied here, a lab-induced bad mood can
down-regulate the extent to which readers rely on heuristics to
rapidly anticipate who will be talked about next, while at the
same time leaving syntactic parsing relatively unaffected. Does
this generalize to the many other communicative arenas where
joint attention plays a role? For instance, if we are in a neg-
ative mood, are we less inclined to resolve the many different
names that populate classic Russian novels, or to anticipate what
a museum tour guide is about to draw our attention to, with
words or actual pointing? Possibly. What we do know for cer-
tain, however, is that we are all in a particular mood all the
time, and that this affects our perception, cognition, and action
in unobtrusive yet pervasive ways. Our findings show that, at
least for those who were in the grip of a depressing movie,
discourse-level language comprehension is no exception to
the rule.
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APPENDIX: EXAMPLE STORIES
Shown are three examples that combine an implicit causal-
ity manipulation with a syntactic manipulation, as well as
three examples that realize a syntactic manipulation only.
Translations are approximate. Bias-consistent pronoun in bold,
bias-inconsistent pronoun in bold underlined. Syntactically
agreeing critical verbs are in italics, syntactically anomalous crit-
ical verbs are in italics underlined. The full Dutch item set is
available from the first author.
(1a) Bias-consistent pronoun + syntactic agreement/anomaly
Casper en Sophie waren al een aantal jaren goeie vrienden.
Ze hadden elkaar leren kennen tijdens hun stage. Sophie
waardeerde Casper omdat hij in die periode haar vaak had
geholpen zonder dat hij daar zelf belang bij had. De vrien-
den werktenplural/werktesingular nog steeds af en toe samen
aan projecten.
[Casper and Sophie had been close friends for several
years. They got to know each other during an intern-
ship. Sophie appreciated Casper because he had often
helped her in that time, even though it wasn’t in his
own interest. Every now and then, the friends still
collaboratedplural/collaboratedsingular on projects].
(1b) Bias-inconsistent pronoun
Casper en Sophie waren al een aantal jaren goeie vrienden.
Ze hadden elkaar leren kennen tijdens hun stage. Casper
waardeerde Sophie omdat hij in die periode veel hulp van
haar had gekregen zonder dat zij daar zelf belang bij had.
[Casper and Sophie had been close friends for several years.
They got to know each other during an internship. Casper
appreciated Sophie because he had received a lot of help
from her in that time, even though it wasn’t in her own
interest].
(2a) Bias-consistent pronoun + syntactic agreement/anomaly
Carice van Houten en Tom Cruise werkten aan een nieuwe
film. Ze hadden samen het script bestudeerd. Tom irriteerde
Carice omdat hij tijdens de opnames herhaaldelijk zijn
tekst vergat. De andere actrices dweeptenplural/dweeptesingular
allemaal met hem, maar dat gevoel was zij inmiddels wel
kwijt.
[Carice van Houten and Tome Cruise were working on
a new film. They had studied the script together. Tom
annoyed Carice because he repeatedly forgot his lines during
takes. The other actresses all ravedplural/ravedsingular about
him, but as for her, she didn’t feel like that at all anymore].
(2b) Bias-inconsistent pronoun
Carice van Houten en Tom Cruise werkten aan een nieuwe
film. Ze hadden samen het script bestudeerd. Carice irri-
teerde Tom omdat hij tijdens de opnames herhaaldelijk haar
fouten moest corrigeren.
[Carice van Houten and TomCruise were working on a new
film. They had studied the script together. Carice annoyed
Tom because he repeatedly had to correct her mistakes
during takes].
(3a) Bias-consistent pronoun+ syntactic agreement/anomaly
Laurie en Jochem waren allebei dol op zoetigheid. Toen
ze op paasochtend beneden kwamen, bleek de paashaas
van chocola een oor te missen. Jochem bekende aan
Laurie omdat hij wist dat ontkennen geen zin had. Hij
beloofdesingular /beloofdenplural ter compensatie een nieuwe
paashaas te kopen zodra de winkels open waren.
[Laura and John both really loved chocolate. When they got
downstairs on Easter morning, the chocolate Easter Bunny
turned out to miss an ear. John confessed to Laura because
he knew there was no point in denying. To make up, he
promisedsingular/promisedplural to buy a new Easter Bunny as
soon as shops would be open].
(3b) Bias-inconsistent pronoun
Laurie en Jochem waren allebei dol op zoetigheid. Toen ze
op paasochtend beneden kwamen, bleek de paashaas van
chocola een oor te missen. Laurie bekende aan Jochem
omdat hij wist dat alleen zij het kon zijn geweest.
[Laura and John both really loved chocolate. When they got
downstairs on Easter morning, the chocolate Easter Bunny
turned out to miss an ear. Laura confessed to John because
he knew that only she could have done it].
(4) Syntactic agreement/anomaly
Annabel en Tom hebben samen een krantenwijk. Annabel
doetsingular/doenplural de linkerkant van de weg en Tom de
rechterkant. Omdat er aan de linkerkant meer huizen staan
is Tom vaak eerder klaar.
[Annabel and Tom share a newspaper round together.
Annabel doessingular/doplural the left side of the road and Tom
does the right side. Because there are more houses on the
left, Tom is often done first].
(5) Syntactic agreement/anomaly
Vroeger nam mijn vader me vaak mee naar allerlei musea.
We praattenplural/praattesingular dan vaak uren voor een
enkel schilderij. Hij wist overal wel iets interessants over te
vertellen.
[My dad used to take me to all kinds of museums. We often
talkedplural/talkedsingular for hours about particular paint-
ings. He always had something interesting to say, about
anything].
(6) Syntactic agreement/anomaly
Koen en Wilma gingen een avondje uit. Wilma
draaidesingular/draaidenplural al uren rondjes voor de
spiegel, ook al bleef Koen haar ervan verzekeren dat ze niet
dik leek in die jurk. Ze stond daar nu al zo lang dat hij
verging van de honger.
[Ken and Wilma went out for dinner that night. For hours,
Wilma lingeredsingular /lingeredplural in front of the mirror,
even though Ken assured her again and again that she didn’t
look fat in that dress. She had been standing there for so long
that, by now, he was starving].
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